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147 
RELIGION WITHOUT GOD AND THE FUTURE OF 
FREE EXERCISE 
R. GEORGE WRIGHT* 
In Religion Without God,1 Ronald Dworkin offers a distinctive moral reading of, 
primarily, the Free Exercise Clause,2 rather than an historical or precedent-based 
reading of that clause. Professor Dworkin’s reading apparently seeks to expand the 
class of persons whose beliefs might fall within the potential coverage of the Free 
Exercise Clause. But Dworkin’s recommended class of covered persons is, we shall 
suggest, controversial in both its inclusions and exclusions.3 Dworkin’s criteria for 
the revised class of those covered by the Free Exercise Clause would likely be 
unstable,4 with significant further consequences for the substance of free exercise 
jurisprudence in general.5 The limits of free exercise conscience coverage would, we 
suggest, likely be further re-set, not in accordance with Professor Dworkin’s criteria, 
but instead in accord with what we might call a broader Hobbesian egalitarianism.6 
And as the class of persons covered by the Free Exercise Clause thus expands under 
contemporary cultural circumstances, we should realistically expect a general 
depreciation7 of the Free Exercise Clause. 
Professor Dworkin seeks, apparently, to expand and to limit the scope of Free 
Exercise Clause coverage to persons holding and motivated by particular beliefs he 
refers to as, in a broad sense, religious. The idea of religion, one might imagine, 
should encompass, at a bare minimum, recognizable theists, whether such theists 
would also think of moral values as objective or not.8 But Dworkin indicates that for 
his purposes, religion must hold “that inherent, objective value permeates 
                                                                                                                                          
 * Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School 
of Law. 
 1 RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2013).  
 2 U.S. CONST. amend. I. This is not to suggest that Dworkin is here unconcerned either 
with the Establishment Clause, or with broader principles of any constitution informed by 
liberal equality. For the inseparability of free exercise and Establishment Clause privileges 
and burdens, see, for example, Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 
50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 11 (2000). 
 3 See infra notes 32-48 and accompanying text. 
 4 See infra notes 38-56 and accompanying text. 
 5 See infra notes 56-76 and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text. 
 7 For a sense of this metaphorical usage, see Depreciation Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/50423?redirectedFrom=depreciation#eid (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2013). 
 8 See, e.g., THOMAS L. CARSON, VALUE AND THE GOOD LIFE 267 (2000) (summarizing a 
combination of a non-realist theory of value with a theistic “divine preference” theory of 
morality and rational action). 
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everything,9 that the universe and its creatures are awe-inspiring,10 that human life 
has purpose and the universe order.”11 Such persons may, on Dworkin’s theory, 
harbor “profound”12 “convictions”13 comparable to those of traditional theists. 
Dworkin’s non-theistic religious believers are said to “find the Grand Canyon not 
just arresting but breathtakingly and eerily wonderful. They are not simply interested 
in the latest discoveries about vast space but enthralled by them,”14 on objective 
grounds.15 More broadly, the Dworkinian-protected atheist religious believer 
recognizes something like “beauty and sublimity,”16 and the idea, or the experience, 
of the “supernatural.”17 
                                                                                                                                          
 9 Professor Dworkin famously argues that the objectivity, or lack of objectivity, of ethical 
principles does not belong to a realm of metaethics separate and distinct from substantive or 
normative ethics. See Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87 (1996); see also MATTHEW KRAMER, MORAL REALISM AS A MORAL 
DOCTRINE (2009); THOMAS NAGEL, THE LAST WORD (2001). For a sampling of responses to 
this claim, see Brian Leiter, Objectivity, Morality, and Adjudication, in OBJECTIVITY IN LAW 
AND MORALS 66, 66 (Brian Leiter ed., 2001); Nicos Stravropoulos, Review of Objectivity in 
Law and Morals, 65 MOD. L. REV. 634 (2002); John Tasioulas, The Legal Relevance of 
Ethical Objectivity, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 211, 225-27 (2002); see also the respective contributions 
of Russ Shafer-Landau, Daniel Star, & Michael Smith in Symposium, The Possibility of 
Metaethics, 90 B.U. L. REV. 479 (2010). Whether Dworkin is right about this is of genuine 
importance. But the question does not bear decisively on the subject of this essay, and will 
herein be set aside. 
 10 Already, the reader may rightly sense that Dworkin’s account of “religion” without God 
may sound more like a central case-focused account, as opposed to an attempt to draw precise 
lines of inclusion or exclusion regarding what should count as religion without God for free 
exercise purposes. 
 11 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 1. 
 12 Id. at 2. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. at 2-3. Again, unless Professor Dworkin intends these attitudes to be merely 
illustrative, it would not be difficult to characterize his approach to non-theistic religion as 
narrowly “intellectualist,” or even class-biased, unless we assume that enthrallment with dark 
energy, dark matter, the Higgs boson, string theory, amplituhedrons, and quantum gravity is a 
realistic possibility for all competent adults. 
 15 Id. at 3. For an interesting approach to an ultimate blurring of the objective and the 
subjective, see Steven D. Smith, Is God Irrelevant?, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1339 (2014).  
 16 Id. at 6. The idea of the ‘sublime’ is not without murkiness, and can even be rather off-
putting. For a classic exposition, not necessarily endorsed by Dworkin, see EDMUND BURKE, A 
PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS OF THE SUBLIME AND BEAUTIFUL 
(Harvard Classics ed., 1914) (1757), available at www.bartleby.com/24/2/107.html 
(“[W]hatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger, that is to say, 
whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner 
analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime . . . .”); see also IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF 
THE POWER OF JUDGMENT 139 (Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews trans., 2001) (1793) (“[T]rue 
sublimity must be sought only in the mind of one who judges, not in the object in nature”); id. 
at 127 (“[W]e express ourselves incorrectly if we call some object of nature sublime . . . .”).  
 17 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 6; see also id. at 12 (“the enchantment . . . of transcendental 
value”). 
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In fact, to qualify on Dworkin’s terms as a free exercise-covered atheist, or 
otherwise non-theistic religious believer, a person must reject “all forms of 
naturalism,”18 in general,19 and naturalism as to values in particular.20 Naturalism in 
Dworkin’s sense is thus incompatible with a religious outlook or attitude, and is thus 
presumably incompatible as well with coverage under the Free Exercise Clause. 
Whether any such free exercise coverage exclusion would, in light of available 
alternative constitutional theories, make much practical difference, even for the 
excluded naturalists, is open to some question.21 
Dworkin then further, and even more controversially, specifies that for atheists 
and other non-believers in one or more divinities to count as religious in Dworkin’s 
sense—presumably, with Free Exercise Clause implications—such persons must 
reject not only naturalism, but must also reject a quite distinct and broadly popular 
view that Dworkin calls “grounded realism” about value.22 Grounded realism, which 
is incompatible with religion in Dworkin’s sense, is the belief that our value 
judgments may be grounded on distinct and separate good reasons—perhaps through 
divine revelation,23 the deliverances of natural law, abduction, induction, or reasoned 
probabilistic argument to a sensible conclusion—for our value judgments.24 
                                                                                                                                          
 18 Id. at 13. 
 19 Id. at 12. 
 20 Id. at 13. The idea of ‘naturalism,’ or something vaguely like the methods or results of 
the sciences broadly understood, is subject to ambiguity and confusion. For a sorting of the 
strands in the area of legal philosophy, see Brian Leiter, Naturalism in Legal Philosophy, 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-
naturalism/ (last revised July 31, 2012). For a broad, but critical view, see STEWART GOETZ & 
CHARLES TALIAFERRO, NATURALISM (2008). Compare also the approach taken in THOMAS 
NAGEL, MIND AND COSMOS: WHY THE MATERIALIST NEO-DARWINIAN CONCEPTION OF NATURE 
IS ALMOST CERTAINLY FALSE (2012). 
 21 For a provocative argument suggesting, as alternatives to free exercise claims, freedom 
of association, freedom of assembly, freedom of thought and speech, privacy, and perhaps 
even equal protection, see James W. Nickel, Who Needs Freedom of Religion, 76 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 941 (2005); see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 
694, 706 (2012) (freedom of association as an inadequate substitute for, or less than 
equivalent in its protection of, a church’s free exercise right to select its own ministers). 
 22 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 13. 
 23 Dworkin rejects the idea of divine fundamental moral guidance on grounds that involve 
the so-called Euthyphro Dilemma. See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 154. Professor Dworkin 
permits himself to consider only one formulation of, and one basic response to, the Euthyphro 
Dilemma, which is a continuing and contemporary source of fascinating, subtle, and variant 
argumentation. Virtually any Divine Command approach to ethics will at least implicitly 
address the Euthyphro Dilemma in one way or another, such that the variety of contemporary 
Divine Command Ethics responses cannot herein be displayed. For some recent approaches to 
the Euthyphro Dilemma, see, for example, ROBERT M. ADAMS, FINITE AND INFINITE GOODS: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR ETHICS (1999); ROBERT AUDI, RATIONALITY AND RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT 
pt. III, ch. 6 (2011); DAVID BAGGETT & JERRY L. WALLS, GOOD GOD: THE THEISTIC 
FOUNDATIONS OF MORALITY (2011); C. STEPHEN EVANS, GOD AND MORAL OBLIGATION 
(2013); IS GOODNESS WITHOUT GOD GOOD ENOUGH?: A DEBATE ON FAITH, SECULARISM AND 
ETHICS (Nathan L. King & Robert K. Garcia eds., 2009); JOHN E. HARE, GOD’S CALL: MORAL 
REALISM, GOD’S COMMANDS AND MORAL REQUIREMENTS (2001) RICHARD SWINBURNE, THE 
COHERENCE OF THEISM ch. 11 (rev. ed., 1993); KEITH WARD, MORALITY, AUTONOMY, AND 
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The supposedly constitutionally required alternative, ungrounded realism,25 de-
emphasizes the various sorts of evidence and factual judgments above. Dworkin’s 
ungrounded realism relies more on our own subjectively persuasive value 
judgments, as tested by our responsible reflection on our various moral and other 
value convictions.26 ‘Responsible’ reflection might bring certain of the above broad 
forms of reasoning into play.27 But Dworkin argues that “the world of value is self-
contained and self-certifying.”28 If this Dworkinian view itself admittedly involves a 
kind of faith,29 Dworkin is, after all, introducing this category of supposedly 
ungrounded value realism precisely as a necessary condition of free exercise 
coverage of non-theistic30 religious belief.31 
It is useful at this point to notice how many sophisticated contemporary 
approaches to ethics, atheistic or otherwise, are ruled out of possible coverage under 
the Free Exercise Clause by Dworkin, on one ground or another. Merely to illustrate 
                                                                                                                                          
GOD (2013); Richard Joyce, Theistic Ethics and the Euthyphro Dilemma, 30 J. Religious 
Ethics 49 (2002); T.J. Mawson, The Euthyphro Dilemma, 7 THINK 25 (2008) (citing, e.g., T.J. 
MAWSON, BELIEF IN GOD: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION ch. 4 (2005)); 
Simin Rahimi, A Resolution to the Euthyphro Dilemma, 50 HEYTHROP J., 753 (2009); Linda 
Zagzebski, The Virtues of God and the Foundations of Ethics, 15 FAITH & PHIL. 538 (1998)); 
Nick Zangwill, A Way Out of the Euthyphro Dilemma, 48 RELIGIOUS STUDIES 7 (2012). 
Dworkin relies as well on a broad reading, even in the extremely distinctive context of a God 
who is defined as knowing, benevolent Love itself, of David Hume’s principle of not inferring 
a moral ‘ought’ from a mere ‘is.’ See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. 111, 
pt. I, § 1 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1968) (1789); see DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 26, 31. On 
Dworkin’s view, traditional theists thus supposedly turn out to be “ungrounded,” as opposed 
to “grounded,” value realists. See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 22-31. 
 24 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 15-21. 
 25 Id. at 15. 
 26 Id. at 4, 15. For a brief similar account by Dworkin’s colleague Thomas Nagel, see 
NAGEL, supra note 20, at 102-03. 
 27 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 23-24. 
 28 Id. at 16. 
 29 Id. at 17. 
 30 Presumably Dworkin does not argue that, say, most traditional believers in divine 
command ethics, as supposedly grounded value realists, would thereby not meet the 
appropriate requirements of religious belief for free exercise purposes. Nor, presumably, 
would the illogic or incoherence of some or all divine command ethicists, in view of 
Dworkin’s understanding of the Euthyphro Dilemma and Hume’s Is-Ought divide, see 
DWORKIN, supra note 1, disqualify their beliefs from Free Exercise Clause coverage. Actually, 
Dworkin’s rigid distinction between religious fact claims and religious value claims allows 
him to oddly conclude that theistic realism is in fact, happily, ungrounded rather than 
grounded, id. at 22-31. 
 31 Dworkin appears to conclude that those who, like, say, John Mackie, would deny that 
“ungrounded realism” can sufficiently justify the objectivity of moral beliefs do not and 
cannot refute the ungrounded value realism approach, but merely reject or fail to share this 
supposedly essential element of a broadly religious perspective. See J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: 
INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1977) (arguably developing a so-called “error theory” of 
metaethics). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss1/10
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the clarity with which thoughtful approaches may fall outside of Dworkin’s free 
exercise entrance criteria, consider these excerpts from the short catechism of Duke 
philosopher Alex Rosenberg: 
Is there a God? No . . . What is the meaning of life? “[There is none]” . . . 
What is the difference between right and wrong, good and bad? There is 
no moral difference between them. Why should I be moral? Because it 
makes you feel better than being immoral. Is anything you don’t like 
forbidden, permissible, or sometimes obligatory? Anything goes.32 
 This is an example of how a presumably conscientious, intellectually responsible, 
and in a sense a conscience-sensitive philosopher may fall outside the scope of free 
exercise coverage Dworkin seeks for some, but hardly all, atheists and agnostics. 
More broadly, Dworkin’s requirements—including value objectivity, non-
naturalism, and ungrounded realism—exclude from his expanded free exercise 
coverage a remarkably wide range of cogently argued-for perspectives,33 developed 
and endorsed by responsible persons of sincere conscience34 and principle. 
                                                                                                                                          
 32 ALEX ROSENBERG, THE ATHEIST’S GUIDE TO REALITY: ENJOYING LIFE WITHOUT 
ILLUSIONS 2-3 (2011). 
 33 For a highly selective list of only those well-reputed more or less contemporary 
philosophers who would at least arguably be excluded from any possible accommodation 
under Dworkin’s criteria, consider SIMON BLACKBURN, ESSAYS IN QUASI-REALISM (1993); 
SIMON BLACKBURN, RULING PASSIONS: A THEORY OF PRACTICAL REASONING (2000); DANIEL 
C. DENNETT, BREAKING THE SPELL: RELIGION AS A NATURAL PHENOMENON (reprt. ed. 2007); 
RICHARD GARNER, BEYOND MORALITY (1993); DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 
(1986); ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF  NORMATIVE JUDGMENT 
(1990); ALLAN GIBBARD, THINKING HOW TO LIVE (2008); R.M. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON 
(1977); GILBERT HARMAN, THE NATURE OF MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS (1977); 
RICHARD JOYCE, THE MYTH OF MORALITY (2007); RICHARD JOYCE, THE EVOLUTION OF 
MORALITY (2007); MARK ELI KALDERON, MORAL FICTIONALISM (2005); PHILIP KITCHER, THE 
ETHICAL PROJECT (2011); J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1977); JESSE 
PRINZ, THE EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF MORALS (2007); RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, 
RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (1990); JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND 
NOTHINGNESS (Hazel E. Barnes trans., reprt. ed.1993); WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, 
MORAL SKEPTICISMS (2006); CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE (1944); Sharon 
Street, A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value, 127 PHIL. STUD. 109 (2006); 
MARK TIMMONS, MORALITY WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS: A DEFENSE OF ETHICAL 
CONTEXTUALISM (1999); J.O. URMSON, THE EMOTIVE THEORY OF ETHICS (1969) (discussing 
A.J. Ayer; Charles L. Stevenson); DAVID B. WONG, NATURAL MORALITIES: A DEFENSE OF 
PLURALISTIC RELATIVISM (2006). See also several contributions to the recent Special Issue: 
Irrealism in Ethics, 26 RATIO 351-470 (2013) (Bart Streumer, ed.) For any misclassifications 
above -- relativism in particular comes in objectivist and non-objectivist varieties -- the reader 
should feel entirely free to enter substitutions into the above roster. 
 34 For a highly selective historical tour of the idea of conscience, in various distinct senses, 
but all arguably relevant to contemporary constitutional concerns, see, for example, PLATO, 
APOLOGY (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1871) (~399 BCE) available at 
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/apology.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2013) (“You have often heard 
me speak of an oracle or sign which comes to me, and is the divinity which Meletus ridicules 
in the indictment. This sign I have had ever since I was a child. The sign is a voice which 
comes to me and always forbids me to do something which I am going to do, but never 
commands me to do anything . . . .”); AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS 180 (Henry Chadwick trans., 
1991) (reissued 2008) (~398) (“Every day my conscience makes confession relying on the 
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hope of your mercy as more to be trusted than its own innocence.”); JOHN CLIMACUS, THE 
LADDER OF DIVINE ASCENT 230 (Colm Luibheid & Norman Russell, trans., 1982) (~620?) 
(“Let our God-directed conscience be our aim and rule in everything so that, knowing how the 
wind is blowing, we may set our sails accordingly.”); BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX, On 
Conversion, in SELECTED WORKS 63, 95 (G.R. Evans trans., 1987) (~1140) (“the gnawing of 
the conscience”); BONAVENTURE, THE SOUL’S JOURNEY INTO GOD para. 6, at 62 (Ewert 
Cousins trans., 1978) (~1259) (“[T]he spark of conscience” as “the summit of the mind,” 
along with other powers of the soul, “implanted in us by nature, deformed by sin and reformed 
by grace.”) ([C]onscience, like the other powers, “must be cleansed by justice, exercised by 
knowledge and perfected by wisdom.”); THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA first part, qu. 
79, arts. 12-13 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., rev. 2d ed., 1920); (Kevin 
Knight online ed., 2008) (~1270), available at www.newadvent.org/summa (last visited Nov. 
20, 2013) (“Synderesis” as inclining us to the good, but “conscience” can be “laid aside.”); 
DUNS SCOTUS, ON THE WILL AND MORALITY 165 (Alan B. Wolter & William A. Frank trans., 
1997) (~1300) (“[C]onscience is the habit of making proper practical conclusions, according 
to which a right choice of what is to be done is apt by nature to follow . . . .”); CATHERINE OF 
SIENA, THE DIALOGUE 90 (Suzanne Nofke trans., 1980) (~1378) (“Conscience always pulls in 
one direction, and sensuality in the other.”); id. at 120 (“the judgment seat of her conscience”) 
(referring also frequently to the “gnawing worm” or to the “dog” of conscience); THOMAS À 
KEMPIS, THE IMITATION OF CHRIST book 1, at 17 (Aloysius Croft & Harold Bolton trans., 
2003) (~1425) (“No man rejoices safely unless he has within him the testimony of a clean 
conscience.”); GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, SAINT JOAN: A CHRONICLE PLAY IN SIX SCENES AND 
AN EPILOGUE scene V, at 103 (Penguin ed., 1946) (1924) (focusing on approximately the year 
1430) (“JOAN [crossly] Well, I have to find reasons for you, because you do not believe in 
my voices. But the voices come first; and I find the reasons after”); id. at 110 (“JOAN . . . And 
how can you say that I am disobedient when I always obey my voices, because they come 
from God”); IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA, SPIRITUAL EXERCISES AND SELECTED WORKS 141 (George 
E. Ganss trans., 1991) (1524) (referring to “the worm of conscience”); SAINT THOMAS MORE, 
SELECTED WRITINGS 137 (John F. Thornton & Susan B. Varenne eds., 2003) (letter to 
Margaret Roper of Apr. 17, 1534) (“I had not informed my conscience neither suddenly nor 
slightly but by long leisure and diligent search . . . .”); id. at 139 (“I . . . leave every man to his 
own conscience [on the oath]. And methinketh in good faith that so it were good reason that 
every man should leave me to mine.”); THERESA OF AVILA, THE WAY OF PERFECTION 76 (E. 
Allison Pears trans., 2011) (1577) (“Endeavor always to have a good conscience; practice 
humility; despise all worldly things.”); MONTAIGNE, THE COMPLETE ESSAYS 506 (Donald M. 
Frame trans., 1958) (~1580) (“It is ordinary to see good intentions, if they are carried out 
without moderation, push men to very vicious acts.”); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING RICHARD 
III act V, scene 3 (1597) (“RICHARD: My conscience hath a thousand several tongues,/And 
every tongue brings in a several tale,/And every tale condemns me for a villain”); JOHN 
LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION: IN FOCUS 32 (John Horton & Susan Mendus, 
eds., 1991) (1689) (“No way whatsoever that I shall walk in against the dictates of my 
conscience will ever bring me to the mansions of the blessed.”); ANTHONY ASHLEY COOPER 
EARL OF SHAFTSBURY, CHARACTERISTICS OF MEN, MANNERS, OPINIONS, TIMES 305 (John M. 
Robertson ed., 1964) (1711) (“[R]eligious conscience [in the sense of fearing the irresistible 
exercise of either just or unjust divine punishments] supposes moral and natural conscience.”); 
JOSEPH BUTLER, Sermon II, in FIVE SERMONS, 34, 37 (Stephen L. Darwall ed., 1983) (1726) 
(“[C]onscience in every man . . . pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves 
just, right, good; others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust . . . .”); FRANCIS HUTCHESON, 
AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND CONDUCT OF THE PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS, WITH 
ILLUSTRATIONS ON THE MORAL SENSE 7-8 (Aaron Garrett & Knud Haakonssen eds., 2002) 
(1728) (citing and relying on an active individual ‘moral sense’);  GEORGE BERKELEY, 
ALCIPHRON, OR THE MINUTE PHILOSOPHER: IN FOCUS 43 (David Berman ed., 1993) (1752) 
(character of “Euphranor”) (“conscience always supposeth the being of a God”); ADAM 
SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 339 (Ryan Patrick Hanley ed., 2010) (1759) 
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(“The word conscience does not immediately denote any moral faculty by which we approve 
or disapprove. Conscience supposes, indeed, the existence of some such faculty, and properly 
signifies our consciousness of having acted agreeably or contrary to its directions.”); id. at 
129-30 (conscience as a “supposed impartial and well-informed spectator . . .the great judge 
and arbiter”); HUME, supra note 23, at 458 (“Moral distinctions . . . are not the offspring of 
reason. Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a principle as 
conscience.”); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 189-90 (Mary Gregor trans., 
1996) (1797) (“Consciousness of an internal court in man (‘before which his thoughts accuse 
or excuse another’) is conscience.”) (“conscience is the inner judge of all free actions”) 
(elaborated in Allen Wood, Kant on Conscience, available at 
www.stanford.edu/~allenw/webpapers/KantOnConscience.pdf) (distinguishing “moral 
knowledge,” “motivator,” and “reflection” theories of conscience);  ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, 
THE ESSENTIAL SCHOPENHAUER: KEY SELECTIONS FROM THE WORLD AS WILL AND 
REPRESENTATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 197, 205 (Wolfgang Schirmacher ed., 2010) (~1819) 
(conscience as “the felt knowledge” of “the ethical significance of conduct”); G.W.F. HEGEL, 
ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT part II, sec. 3, § 137, at 164 (Allen Wood ed., H.B. 
Nisbet trans., 1991) (1821) (“True conscience is the disposition to will what is good in and for 
itself; it therefore has fixed principles, and these have for it the character of determinacy and 
duties which are objective for themselves.”); HENRY DAVID THOREAU, ON THE DUTY OF CIVIL 
DISOBEDIENCE 3 (1849), available at www.gutenberg.org/files/71/71-h/71-h.html (updated 
May 3, 2011) (“Must the citizen ever for a moment, or in the least degree, resign his 
conscience to the legislator? Why has every man a conscience then?”); JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, 
A Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, in CONSCIENCE, CONSENSUS, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
DOCTRINE 434, 453 (James Gaffney ed., 1992) (1875) (conscience not as “a fancy or an 
opinion, but as a [well-informed] dutiful obedience to what claims to be a divine voice, 
speaking within us”); id. at 452 (noting the various limits and vulnerabilities of subjective 
(religious) conscience); HENRIK IBSEN, An Enemy of the People, in THE COMPLETE MAJOR 
PROSE PLAYS 277, 356 (Rolf Fjelde trans., 1965) (Penguin ed., 1978) (1882) (character of Dr. 
Thomas Stockmann: “The majority is never right. I say never! That’s one of those social lies 
that any free man who thinks for himself has to rebel against”); FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Dawn: 
Thoughts About Morality as a Prejudice, in ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS AND ECCE HOMO 
290, 290-291 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1967) (1888) (the “revaluation of all values” as “a 
liberation from all moral values, in saying Yes to and having confidence in all that has hitherto 
been forbidden, despised, and damned. This Yes-saying . . . pours out its light, its love, its 
tenderness upon so many wicked things; it gives back to them their ‘soul,’ a good conscience, 
the lofty right and privilege of existence. Morality is not attacked; it is merely no longer in the 
picture”); WILLIAM JAMES, The Varieties of Religious Experience, in WRITINGS 1902-1910 1, 
463 (Library of America ed., 1988) (referring to “my objective and my subjective 
conscience”); HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS XIII (John Rawls ed., 7th ed. 1981) 
(1907) (“I hold with Butler that ‘Reasonable Self-Love and Conscience are the two chief . . . 
principles in the nature of man,’ each of which we are under a ‘manifest obligation’ to 
obey.”); Gilbert Ryle, Conscience and Moral Convictions, 7 ANALYSIS 31, 34 (1940) (“In this 
sense conscience is never a merely verdict-passing faculty. Its exercise is behaving or trying to 
behave and not describing or recommending.”); C.D. Broad, Conscience and Conscientious 
Action, 15 PHIL. 115, 118 (1940) (conscience in a broad sense as involving moral reflection, 
appropriate moral emotions, and the disposition to seek what is believed to be morally good 
and avoid what is believed to be morally bad); JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 90 
(Catholic Univ. of America Press ed., 1998) (1951) (human knowledge of the unwritten 
natural law as imperfect but very gradually increasing as the human conscience develops); 
Larry May, On Conscience, 20 AM. PHIL. Q. 57, 64 (1983) (“conscience acts as an enlightened 
but nonetheless egoistic counterweight to the more simple egoistic motivations to act 
selfishly”); JOSEPH RATZINGER, ON CONSCIENCE: TWO ESSAYS 62 (2007) (“Conscience 
requires [proper] formation and education [not mere socialization or popular opinion]. It can 
become stunted, it can be stamped out, it can be falsified.”); MOTHER TERESA, NO GREATER 
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Professor Dworkin is certainly entitled to recommend restricting additional entry 
into free exercise coverage only to those atheists or agnostics, etc., who meet his 
rather distinctive criteria.35 But we should not expect all of those excluded thereby to 
readily accept constitutional second class status, particularly as other atheists and 
agnostics are, on Dworkin’s proposal, being admitted to free exercise coverage. 
Without addressing the merits of the various underlying metaethical positions 
involved, it seems clear that some excluded metaethical noncognitivists, error 
theorists, quasi-realists, expressivists, emotivists, fictionalists, relativists, and 
pragmatists, at a minimum might want to argue that their own particular view is 
actually all that is coherently or otherwise rationally available, or that is “worth 
wanting.”36 For such persons, Dworkin’s exclusionary criteria from free exercise 
coverage may seem arbitrary and readily contestable.  
At this point, it is worth remembering that all those persons, including, very 
briefly, quasi-realists, emotivists, and pragmatists, excluded from Dworkin’s free 
exercise coverage37 would still retain some religion clause rights, specifically, as 
complainants in typical Establishment Clause cases. Presumably, an atheist of any 
sort, even an atheist not taken by intimations of the ineffable in a Higgs field or a 
sunrise, if sufficiently burdened, could bring an Establishment Clause challenge 
against a religious display.38 
                                                                                                                                          
LOVE 47 (2002) (“There is a natural conscience in every human being to know right from 
wrong . . . drawing them to God.); JONATHAN HAIDT, THE HAPPINESS HYPOTHESIS 3 (2006) 
(the Freudian super-ego or conscience as “a sometimes too rigid commitment” to the rules of 
society) (for a brief further discussion of the Freudian conscience, see PAUL STROHM, 
CONSCIENCE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 59-75 (2011)); William Lyons, Conscience: An 
Exercise in Moral Psychology, 84 PHIL. 477, 478 (2009) (distinguishing “classical Christian,” 
“Freudian,” and a “personal integrity” approach to conscience); id. at 488 (the “personal 
integrity” view of conscience as the gradual, multi-source result, over time, of a “deep 
commitment” to “objective” and “other-regarding” moral principles); STEVEN PINKER, THE 
BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE 670 (reprt. ed., 2012) (“reason, principle, conscience, the . . . 
man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct” as capable of counteracting “strong 
impulses of self-love”); JOSHUA GREENE, MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE GAP 
BETWEEN US AND THEM 294 (2013) (“[W]hen the problem is Me versus Us (or Me versus 
You) we should trust our gut moral reactions, otherwise known as conscience.”). 
 35 See supra note 33 (selectively represents various schools of contemporary thought). 
 36 For a structurally parallel argument by Dworkin himself in the distinct context of 
immortality, see DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 158-59. The “worth wanting” formulation is 
developed in DANIEL C. DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM: THE VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH 
WANTING (1984). 
 37 At the risk of over-intellectualizing Professor Dworkin’s practical recommendation, we 
might imagine a free exercise plaintiff being cross examined on the standing issue: a plaintiff 
influenced by Dworkin himself would, all else equal, qualify, whereas a plaintiff who is 
motivated by views closer to Blackburn’s projectivist quasi-realism, Stevenson’s classic 
emotivism, or Rorty’s pragmatism, at whatever level of sophistication, would be vulnerable on 
the issue of standing. The thought of our most widely respected metaethicists serving as expert 
witnesses on such matters has a certain appeal. 
 38 For an intriguing discussion of standing requirements in Establishment Clause context, 
as opposed to Free Exercise Clause context, see, for example, both opinions in Books v. 
Elkhart County, 401 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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On Free Exercise Clause claims, though, Dworkin must argue that atheists who, 
among other criteria, accept value objectivity, non-naturalism, and ungrounded value 
realism are relevantly closer to, say, the classically theistic martyr than to any of the 
wide range of exponents of metaethical principles that Dworkin’s constitutional 
criteria exclude.39 This is a complex and plainly contentious matter. Dworkin, no less 
than anyone else, would need a genuinely satisfactory theory as to why his own 
preferred criteria, and not some other set of criteria, should be decisive. The bare 
idea of equality of respect for persons,40 by itself, can hardly be of much help in 
deciding whether one class of persons is more relevantly similar to a constitutionally 
included group than to an excluded group. 
We can hardly do more here than to hint at a few of the difficulties Dworkin’s 
free exercise exclusions engender. Imagine merely three characters: Joan, a 
traditional theist driven by religious conscience,41 Ronald, motivated by a distinct set 
of beliefs,42 and Simon,43 a sophisticated metaethicist excluded, on Dworkin’s 
criteria, from free exercise standing in typical cases. Imagine as well any set of 
contexts in which Joan, or Ronald, or Simon might wish to bring a free exercise 
claim. And let us again set aside any difficulties of classification and application of 
Dworkin’s criteria. 
Suppose also that we also determine that Joan, Ronald, and Simon all have a 
conscience,44 in some arguably relevant sense,45 implicated by the particular free 
exercise context at hand. What role should such a conscience play in recognizing 
free exercise standing? The role of conscience by itself certainly need not be 
decisive. Other qualities, attitudes, emotions, or beliefs held by Joan, Ronald, or 
Simon might be relevant as well. Here are merely some other relevant possibilities: 
intensity of feeling; intensity of conviction; intensity of belief; profundity of belief; 
profundity of commitment; core beliefs; importance of belief; a moral compass-
reading; ultimacy of belief; respectworthiness; integrity of the person; “mattering,” 
or passion in caring; depth or persistence or priority of conviction; breadth of the 
relevant conviction; personal authenticity.46 
                                                                                                                                          
 39 DWORKIN, supra note 1, 6-13. 
 40 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 116. 
 41 SHAW, supra note 34 (for Joan); see also MARK TWAIN, JOAN OF ARC (2007) (1896). 
 42 See supra notes 9-31 and accompanying text. 
 43 SIMON BLACKBURN, ESSAYS IN QUASI-REALISM (1993); SIMON BLACKBURN, RULING 
PASSIONS: A THEORY OF PRACTICAL REASONING (2000); see also SIMON BLACKBURN, BEING 
GOOD: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS (2003). 
 44 See supra note 34. At the time of the American constitutional framing, there was 
evidently some serious sentiment for protection of conscience, in addition to, if not instead of, 
the exercise of religion. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of 
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1480-85 (1990) (cited in Gilardi v. HHS, 
733 F.3d 1208, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). For an endorsement of freedom of conscience itself as 
a human right, see Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Conscience as Religious and Moral 
Freedom, L.J. & RELIGION (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2287436 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2013). 
 45 See supra note 34. 
 46 For references, collectively, to one or more of these qualities, see, for example, 
Raimond Gaita & John Haldane, Is God Necessary for Morality, in TRUTH AND FAITH IN 
 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014
156 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:147 
Are none of these considerations of any relevance to free exercise standing? Will 
Joan, Ronald, and Simon all inevitably score equally on all of the considerations we 
might consider relevant? If not, what inferences should we draw?47 Perhaps Joan, 
Ronald, and Simon might, in some cases involving conscience, score roughly 
equally on sheer intensity of passion, or at least all above some relevant threshold of 
intensity. But would persons without any metaphysical commitments also score 
equally, or above the relevant threshold, on a quality such as the “depth” or 
“profundity” of their relevant beliefs? Is the idea of “depth” of “commitment,” apart 
from intensity, generality, articulateness, or duration,48 inherently ‘tilted,’ toward the 
metaphysical believer? Are all equally intensely held moral beliefs entitled to be 
treated as equally profoundly held?49 Are those who reject metaphysics entitled to be 
taken as metaphysically seriously as those who do not? Are those who reject the idea 
of metaphysical respect clearly and uncontroversially entitled to be treated with 
equal metaphysical respect? 
These questions are likely impossible to resolve among the included and 
excluded parties, partly because possible answers might well advantage or 
disadvantage particular approaches to religious and metaethical questions. 
Realistically, are political activists who believe at most only in very minimal, 
attenuated metaethics likely to be content with a second class status under Dworkin’s 
Free Exercise Clause?50 But are they, on the other hand, also likely to develop 
arguments against such status that Dworkin had not anticipated? 
                                                                                                                                          
ETHICS 257, (Hayden Ramsey ed., 2011); JOCELYN MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, 
SECULARISM AND FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE 88-97 (2011); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF 
CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 169 (2008); 
Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and Religion, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1457, 
1494-96; Kent Greenawalt, Religious Toleration and Claims of Conscience, 28 J.L. & POL. 91, 
94 (2013); Kent Greenawalt, The Significance of Conscience, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 901, 915-
17 (2010); Douglas Laycock, The Religious Exemption Debate, 11 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 
139, 170-71 (2009); Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1351, 1418-19 (2012); Steven D. Smith, The Tenuous Case for Conscience, 10 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 325, 357-58 (2005) (re authenticity in particular) (“it seems that freedom 
of conscience depends on a moral position that assigns preeminent value to something like 
‘authenticity,’ even over conduct that conforms to objective moral truth”). 
 47 One would hope to avoid the nightmare of free exercise standing as a continuum, or 
even as involving an open-ended, multi-factor balancing test. 
 48 For a mere first step in one phase of considering such matters, see Jeremy Bentham’s 
dimensions of utility, as articulated in JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. IV (1789), available at 
www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML4.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2013) (distinguishing 
the intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, and purity of pleasures and pains). 
 49 By very loose analogy, how many emotionally mature adults can match the repeated 
sheer emotional intensity of a four-year-old child who will brook no contradiction in asserting 
that he or she is being treated grossly unfairly? 
 50 It is probably fair to imagine that some of the less metaphysically ambitious activists 
would view dilution of the strength of a further equalized Free Exercise Clause as a feature, 
rather than as a bug. For one highly speculative possible dimension of future Free Exercise 
Clause jurisprudence, see R. George Wright, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Religious 
Persecution: Casting Up a Dread Balance Sheet, 47 U. RICH L. REV. 695 (2013). 
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There may be some single best resolution on the merits of the conflict between 
Dworkin’s limited broadening of free exercise coverage and many persons of 
conscience still apparently excluded under Dworkin’s approach. We shall not, 
however, pursue here such a ‘right answer’ on the merits. Instead, we offer here only 
a more pragmatic and predictive observation. Regardless of the merits, it is difficult 
to see Dworkin’s free exercise exclusions, if adopted, as anything like a more or less 
stable equilibrium solution. The various pragmatists, expressivists, emotivists, quasi-
realists, and so forth dissatisfied by Dworkin’s exclusions might benefit from the 
sense that in such conflicts, the initial presumption should be in favor of basic 
equality among persons, and among forms of conscience, regardless of the disputed 
cogency of either side’s arguments on the merits. 
We can call this presumption in favor of yet further inclusion, beyond what 
Dworkin himself endorses, an extended form of a broad “Hobbesian default” in 
favor of equality in the classification of persons and rights-claimants. This reference 
is to Hobbes’ famous characterization of the state of nature. Beginning at least with 
the Hobbesian story, “[e]quality rather than inequality has become the fundamental 
concept of political theory.”51 For Hobbes, the supposed equality of persons in the 
state of nature need not be real. Instead, equality simply must be conceded if peace 
and civility are to be achieved.52 
This obviously loose analogy draws upon the pragmatic realism of Hobbes’ 
Ninth Law of Nature.53 Hobbes argues that 
[i]f Nature therefore have made men equall, that equality is to be 
acknowledged: or if Nature hath made men unequall; yet because men 
that think themselves equall, will not enter into conditions of Peace, but 
upon Equall termes, such equalities must be admitted. And therefore for 
the ninth law of Nature, I put this, That every man acknowledge every 
other for his Equal by Nature.54 
To press the analogy yet further, note that Hobbes specifies that under the social 
contract, “no man require to reserve to himself any Right, which he is not content 
should be reserved to every one of the rest.”55 
                                                                                                                                          
 51 Martin A. Bertman, Equality in Hobbes, with Reference to Aristotle, 38 REV. POL. 534, 
541 (1976). On this much, and at this level of generality, it is hard to imagine either Dworkin, 
or his most prominent excludes, disagreeing. 
 52 Id.  
 53 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN pt. 1, ch. 15, at 211 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968) 
(1651). For brief commentary, see JEAN HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
TRADITION 24-26 (reprt. ed. 1990) (1986); A.P. MARTINICH, HOBBES: A BIOGRAPHY 67-68 
(1999); Alan Ryan, Hobbes’s Political Philosophy, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
HOBBES ch. 9, 208, 217 (Tom Sorell ed., 1996). 
 54 Hobbes, supra note 53, at 211 (first emphasis added). 
 55 Id. (emphasis deleted). For Hobbes’ more fundamental discussion of pragmatic equality 
in the state of nature, id. ch. 13, at 183-84, a classic passage in Western political philosophy. 
For brief commentary, see, for example, MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, HOBBES ON CIVIL 
ASSOCIATION 35 (1975 ed.) (1937). Of course, Hobbes himself endorsed only utterly minimal 
legal accommodation, religiously-based or otherwise, of conscientious objection to typical 
sovereign commands. See Hobbes, supra note 53, ch. 26 at 203, 29 at 247..For perspective, 
see Patricia Springborg, Hobbes on Religion, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HOBBES ch. 
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Obviously, we do not presume that devotees of Dworkin and the non-qualifiers 
under Dworkin’s murky and contestable classifications56 occupy a state of nature. 
The point is merely that disputes over Dworkin’s distinctions, as well as ultimate 
classifications thereunder, are likely to be resolved only on an essentially pragmatic 
or political basis, with the equality of purported consciences being the only realistic 
such basis.57 
If we suppose, then, that on what we might call Hobbesian pragmatic grounds, 
Dworkin’s controversial exclusions from free exercise coverage cannot hold—in 
whole or in part—what sorts of further developments might we reasonably, if 
speculatively, anticipate? 
Dworkin recognizes that once the right to free exercise is extended beyond its 
traditional theistic coverage, serious problems of the degree or depth of 
constitutional protection arise.58 As the breadth of coverage is expended and 
diversified, the depth or strength of the right—the preemptive or “trumping”59 
quality of the right—must be sacrificed.60 A right that will often call for some form 
of personal or group exemption from a standard government practice,61 or from a 
                                                                                                                                          
14, at 346 (Tom Sorrell ed., 1996); Edwin Curley, Hobbes and the Cause of Religious 
Toleration, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HOBBES’S LEVIATHAN ch. 13, at 309 (Patricia 
Springborg ed., 2007). 
 56 As merely one element of potential contestation, we might expect some of those 
unfortunately classified as grounded realists to claim ungrounded realist status, for Dworkin’s 
purposes. And we should equally expect claims that some, if not all, of those classed by 
Dworkin as ungrounded realists are actually, upon deeper review, grounded realists. See supra 
notes 22-31 and accompanying text. The proper application, in individual cases, of even a 
maximally clarified distinction would of course inevitably pose further problems. 
 57 The idea that even arguable unequals should, on one ground or another, be treated as 
equals for some official purpose is familiar as well within the utilitarian and related economic 
theory traditions. See, e.g., Marco E.L. Guidi, “Everybody to Count for One, Nobody for More 
than One:” The Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests from Bentham to Pigou, 4 
Revue d'études benthamiennes [REB] 40 (2008) (Fr.), http://etudes-
benthamiennes.revues.org/182 (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
 58 For the distinction between the extent or scope of coverage of a right, and the depth or 
absoluteness of protection of the right, see Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First 
Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981); Frederick Schauer, Speech 
and “Speech” - Obscenity and “Obscenity”: An Exercise in the Interpretation of 
Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899 (1979). 
 59 See Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153-67 (Jeremy 
Waldron ed., 1984). 
 60 A basically similar view is taken in Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in 
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888-89 (1990). 
 61 See, e.g., the compulsory schooling case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 205 
(1972). 
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costly burden,62 cannot be long sustained if it is typically protected by a demanding 
strict scrutiny test.63 
Dworkin himself resolves this inevitable tradeoff between the scope of coverage 
and the strength of the free exercise right distinctly in favor of the former. Typically, 
the free exercise right should, Dworkin argues, be protected not by a rigorous strict 
scrutiny test,64 but only by a much less demanding, if not also typically evadable, 
mere “ethical independence” test. 65 The ethical independence test requires merely 
that the exercise of religion not be restricted “just because”66 the government deems 
one form of living—apart from its consequences67—to be inherently better than 
another.68 We might call this “moral independence” test, then a “weak”69 
requirement of government neutrality toward the various conceptions of good lives, 
as distinct from a practice’s consequences or any independent rights violation caused 
by the practice.70 
                                                                                                                                          
 62 Consider the risks of military combat service avoided, on sincere conscientious grounds, 
in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 
164-65 (1965). 
 63 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 (requiring a genuinely compelling government interest and 
precise narrow tailoring). Note also that the Yoder majority seeks, with whatever degree of 
success, to crucially distinguish between religious and philosophical grounds for conscience-
based non-compliance with law. Id. at 215-16; see also the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1–
2000bb-4 (1994)), invalidated in part on other grounds by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507, 507 (1997); General Conference v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 410 (6th Cir. 2010) (seeking to 
contrast philosophy and religion). 
 64 See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). But see 
Smith, 494 U.S. at 888-89 (seeking to dispense, more or less broadly, with such a test). 
 65 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 130; see also id. at 133. The more stringently protected rights 
are, in Dworkin’s terminology, referred to instead as “special rights.” Id. at 131. Free speech 
is said to count as such a distinctively protected “special right.” Id. 
 66 Id. at 130. It seems likely that almost any lifestyle judicially found objectionable “in 
itself” could also be colorably objected to on the basis of one or more supposed consequences, 
or rights violations, somehow sufficiently associated with that lifestyle, as Dworkin’s own 
illustrations suggest. Id.  
 67 See id. 
 68 See id. On Dworkin’s view, by the way, “that forests are in fact wonderful,” reflects not 
merely one conception of the good, but a desired consequence of certain thereby legitimate 
public policies. Id. at 131. 
 69 Note especially that any officially imposed preferences among conceptions of the good 
life merely cannot be the sole significant motivation behind the restriction on free exercise. Id. 
Mixed governmental motives should thereby legitimize the restriction on free exercise. There 
may also be ways in which a government can endorse some conception of the good, non-
neutrally, without substantially burdening religious exercise. 
 70 For his brief prior treatment of free exercise as protected only at the lower, less 
demanding level of “ethical independence,” see RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 
375-78 (2011). For an earlier incarnation of Dworkin’s views on government neutrality among 
alternative conceptions of the good life, see RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 181-
204 (1985). For general critical perspective, see, for example, GEORGE SHER, BEYOND 
NEUTRALITY: PERFECTIONISM AND POLITICS (1997). 
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Let us, on this basis, conclude with a bit of further speculation. What sort of 
realistic priority is likely to be placed on religious free exercise by many of those 
newly admitted to free exercise coverage under Dworkin’s theory,71 let alone by 
those initially and unstably denied admission by Dworkin’s controversial 
restrictions?72 As the scope of coverage of any right expands, we should expect, as 
Dworkin’s own analysis suggests,73 a reduction in the general stringency with which 
such a right is enforced. 
But this tendency is only one of the relevant considerations. Let us assume that 
those newly admitted—and many of those still excluded under Dworkin’s criteria—
are moved by considerations of conscience, in some relevant sense,74 just as 
frequently and just as intensely as are currently covered theistic religious believers. 
By itself, though, this assumed equality of fervency would not necessarily indicate 
an equality in the genuine subjective priority of free exercise or individual 
conscience protection among all affected parties. The priority we all set, by analogy, 
on our right not to have troops involuntarily quartered in our homes during time of 
peace75 is a function not only of the degree of genuine harm we would feel if such an 
event occurred, but also of the perceived likelihood of such an event’s actually 
occurring in our own case. 
The priority any of us places on free exercise will thus depend in part on our 
perceptions of how genuinely likely it will be that a government will more, or less, 
substantially burden our own, or our group’s, free exercise of conscience or of 
religion. And this will vary according to historical and cultural or political 
circumstances and prospects, as well as our substantive beliefs, and the likelihood of 
their compatibility with government policies.76 If there is, for one important 
example, no likelihood of a military draft, the realistic priority of a recognized right 
to conscientious objection to military or combat service77 is likely to dramatically 
diminish. 
Of course, a number of other substantive policy concerns may be of greater 
priority today, including various dimensions of equality, the environment, and health 
and welfare policy. But for our purposes, the key question is not the likely popularity 
or unpopularity or even the sheer importance of any set of these or other government 
policies, but whether particular classes of persons or groups are likely to feel bound 
in conscience not just to oppose some such policies, but to conscientiously violate 
some relevant binding legal requirement, in a context in which a stringently 
protected free exercise right would likely protect such persons from civil penalty or 
criminal conviction, or provide some exemption from abhorrent but legally required 
conduct. 
                                                                                                                                          
 71 See supra text accompanying notes 9-17. 
 72 See supra text accompanying notes 18-31. 
 73 See supra notes 56-68 and accompanying text; see also Steven D. Smith, The Phases 
and Functions of Freedom of Conscience (May 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1615625. 
 74 See supra note 34. 
 75 See U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
 76 For one possible scenario, see Wright, supra note 50. 
 77 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss1/10
2014] RELIGION WITHOUT GOD 161 
 
Suppose, merely as a matter of a single example, that a strong majority of those 
newly included—or those still excluded—under Dworkin’s approach strongly 
prioritize a meaningful response to global climate change. The crucial question, 
though, is actually of how likely it is thought to be that a predicted actual 
government will unequivocally require such persons, by law, to relevantly flout their 
conscience. It seems likely that even if persons strenuously disapprove of 
government policy on climate change, as a matter of moral conviction, they may 
well not find themselves legally bound to act, or not act, contrary to the convictions 
in question. This sort of example could be multiplied indefinitely. 
As well, thoughtful persons will recognize that relatively strong free exercise 
protection for those who share their substantive moral and policy views would come 
at the cost, under the Equal Protection Clause,78 of similarly stringent free exercise 
protection for persons whose views, on whatever subject, they find objectionable, if 
not abhorrent. For many of those newly enfranchised under any degree of extension 
of free exercise coverage, the moral cost of recognizing and protecting personally 
objectionable religious claims may well outweigh the genuine moral benefits of 
recognizing the former. A uniform absence of any constitutional recognition for 
conscience objection, traditionally religious or otherwise, may increasingly thus 
seem, on balance, increasingly attractive to many of the newly enfranchised. 
  
                                                                                                                                          
 78 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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